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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the time-varying relationship between economic/financial 
uncertainty and oil price shocks in the US. A structural VAR (SVAR) model and a 
time-varying parameter VAR (TVP-VAR) model are estimated, using six indicators 
that reflect economic and financial uncertainty. The findings of the study reveal that 
static frameworks (SVAR) do not show the full dynamics of the oil price shocks 
effects to the US economic/financial uncertainty. This is owing to the evidence 
provided by the time-varying framework (TVP-VAR), which convincingly shows that 
uncertainty responses to the three oil price shocks are heterogeneous both over time 
and over the different oil price shocks. In particular, uncertainty responses seem to 
experience a shift in the post global financial crisis period. Thus, the conventional 
findings that economic fundamentals response marginally, positively or negatively to 
supply-side, aggregate demand and oil specific demand shocks, respectively, do not 
necessarily hold at all periods. Rather, they are impacted by the prevailing economic 
conditions at each time period. The findings are important to policy makers and 
investors, as they provide new insights on the said relationships. 
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1. Introduction   
Focusing on the US economy, the aim of this paper is to investigate the time-
varying effects of oil price shocks, namely supply-side, aggregate demand and oil 
specific demand shocks, on economic uncertainty. The study focuses on different 
types of economic-wide uncertainty, which capture the different sectors of an 
economy, namely macroeconomic-related, policy-related, commodity-related and 
financial-related uncertainty. In the context of this paper we define economic-wide 
uncertainty as the unknown outcome in the future economic, policy and financial 
markets conditions of the country, when these are confronted with unanticipated 
shocks in oil prices. 
The interest on the drivers of economic uncertainty has reemerged since the 
last financial crisis of 2007-09, the ongoing European debt crisis, the oil price 
collapse since 2014 and more recently the Trump’s victory in the US elections and the 
Brexit vote in the 2016 UK’s referendum (see, inter alia, Bloom, 2009; Baum et al., 
2010; Bachmann et al., 2010; Popescu and Smets, 2010; Antonakakis et al., 2013; 
New York Times, 2016; Bloomberg, 2017; Caggiano et al., 2017).   
Interestingly enough, though, the literature has remained relatively silent on 
the effects of oil prices on economic-wide uncertainty, despite the ample evidence on 
the effects of oil prices (i) on the economy since the 1980s and the seminal paper by 
Hamilton (1983), as well as (ii) on the financial markets, since the seminar paper by 
Jones and Kaul (1996)
1
. The wealth of literature has established that oil prices affect 
the wider economy, via their influence on productivity, inflation or unemployment
2
. 
Nevertheless, examining the effects of oil prices on economic uncertainty is 
rather important, given the effects of the latter to the wider economy, as established 
by Bernanke (1983), Marcus (1981) and Rodrik (1991) among others. More 
specifically, examining the sources of economic uncertainty is of major importance as 
the latter affects the business cycle through its influence on economic activity 
(Pindyck, 1990; Bloom, 2009; Kang et al., 2014; Visco, 2017), either via household 
consumption decisions or firm investments decisions. Put it simply, the higher the 
economic uncertainty the lower the household consumption and the higher the delays 
in capital investments. The impact of oil price shocks on investment uncertainty is 
                                                          
1 See, Sadorsky (1999), Park and Ratti (2008), Filis (2010), Cunado and de Gracia (2014), Angelidis et al. (2015), 
Boldanov et al. (2016) and Antonakakis et al. (2017), among many others. 
2 See, inter alia, Hamilton (1988, 1996), Hooker (1996), Abel and Bernanke (2001), Lee and Ni (2002), Hooker 
(2002), Bernanke (2006), Hamilton (2008, 2009), Lippi and Nobili (2012). 
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also documents by more recent studies, such as those by Elder and Serletis (2010), 
Ratti et al. (2011) and Rahman and Serletis (2011). Although the focus on this paper 
is to identify the direct effects of oil price shocks on economic-wide uncertainty, we 
should not lose sight of the fact that these effects might propagate indirectly via the 
inflation, production or even the size of the public sector channels
3
. The examination 
of these indirect channels, though, falls beyond the scope of the current paper. 
Turning our attention to the linkages between oil prices and financial-related 
uncertainty, the literature is extremely scarce. It is only Degiannakis et al. (2014) who 
provide evidence that oil price shocks exercise an effect on stock market volatility. 
The channel by which these effects are materialized is based on the fact that 
unanticipated changes in the prices of oil lead to abrupt fluctuations in the future 
firms’ cash flows, which then lead to higher uncertainty about the firms’ stock prices. 
Under the valid assumption that most listed firms will be impacted by such 
unanticipated oil price changes, we maintain that oil price shocks lead to higher stock 
market volatility.   
Finally, there is an emerging strand in the energy finance literature which is 
motivated by Filis et al. (2011), Degiannakis et al. (2013), Broadstock and Filis 
(2014), Bekiros et al. (2015) and Aloui et al. (2016), among other, that show time-
varying spillover effects between the aforementioned oil price shocks and economic 
policy uncertainty. For instance, Antonakakis et al. (2014) report that the aggregate 
demand oil price shocks mainly lead to a reduction in economic policy uncertainty, 
whereas oil specific demand shocks and supply-side shocks do not exhibit any strong 
spillover effects. 
Against this backdrop, we maintain that it is important to extend the studies by 
Kang and Rati (2013), Bekiros et al. (2015), Aloui et al. (2016), and Kang et al. 
(2017) and to assess how oil price shocks could also trigger changes in other sources 
                                                          
3
 For instance, recent literature shows that when there is an increase in the price of oil, this causes 
inflationary pressures and lower household consumption  in an oil-importing country, which forces the 
monetary authority to face a trade-off of either stabilizing inflation or output gap, leading to higher 
uncertainty (Natal, 2012; Montoro, 2012). In addition, El Anshasy and Bradley (2012) claim that 
higher oil prices lead to greater government size for the oil-exporting countries. Nevertheless, an 
increased size of the public sector raised issues in terms of the efficient operation of the government, as 
also emphasized by Antonakakis et al. (2014), leading to further economic uncertainty. Along a similar 
vein, Kang and Rati (2013), Antonakakis et al. (2014) and Kang et al. (2017) maintain that policy-
related uncertainty is also affected by oil price shocks. This is rather expected based on the 
aforementioned transmission channels. For instance, the trade-off that the monetary policy is faced 
with in the case of oil price increases, leads to both uncertainty in terms of the outcome in the real 
economy, as well as uncertainty as to whether policy decisions will be successful in stabilizing the 
economy. 
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of economic-wide uncertainty, such as commodity-related and macroeconomic-
related, rather than solely on economic policy and financial uncertainty, which is the 
main focus of the existing literature. This paper aims to fill this void. 
The contribution of this paper can be described succinctly. First, it adds to the 
limited empirical findings on the linkages between oil price shocks and several 
economic-wide uncertainties. Second, we investigate for the first time in the literature 
whether the responses of these economic-wide uncertainty indicators to the three oil 
price shocks are time-varying. Put it simply, this paper analyses the effects of the 
different oil price shocks on a wide range of uncertainty measures in a Structural 
VAR framework, both constant and time-varying. To do so, this study concentrates on 
six key US economic uncertainty indicators for the period January 1994 to March 
2015 and uses a structural VAR (SVAR) model, as well as, a Time-Varying 
Parameter VAR (TVP-VAR).  
Our results can be outlined as follows. The responses of the uncertainty 
indicators to the three oil price shocks, as these were estimated by the SVAR model, 
reveal that oil supply shocks do not exercise any significant impact on uncertainty 
indicators. Furthermore, we find that the two demand-side oil shocks trigger lower 
uncertainty. More importantly, though, through the TVP-VAR model we show that 
impulse responses of the uncertainty indices to the three oil price shocks are not 
constant over time, but rather they vary over time. The time-varying impulse 
responses show that uncertainty indices exhibit heterogeneous responses to all three 
shocks, as well as, during different time periods. More specifically, we show that the 
behaviour of responses changes in the post global financial crisis period, suggesting a 
shift in the relationship between oil shocks and uncertainty indicators.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data 
employed in this study, whereas Section 3 details the methodology. The empirical 
findings of the research are presented in Section 4, whereas Section 5 summarises the 
results and concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data Description 
In this study we employ world oil production (in thousand barrels, PROD), 
Lutz Kilian’s global real economic activity index (GEA)4 and Brent crude oil price 
                                                          
4
 The Kilian’s index became popular selection for the real economic activity worldwide as it captures 
business cycle fluctuations in global base about commodity markets of industrial sector and is used by 
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returns (ROIL), which are used for the construction of the three oil price shocks 
(supply-side, aggregate demand and oil specific demand shocks). We also use six 
measures of economic and financial uncertainty in the US, which capture 
macroeconomic-related (JMU), policy-related (EPU), commodity-related (OCV and 
ORV) and financial-related (EMU and VIX) uncertainty. 
More specifically, we use (i) Jurado’s et al. (2015) macroeconomic 
uncertainty index (JMU), which expresses the common volatility of the 
unforecastable components of 132 macroeconomic indicators; (ii) The Economic 
Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), which is constructed based on three components, i.e. 
newspaper articles of the ten largest newspapers of the US, the temporary provisions 
of the tax code expiration of the US and the factor of disagreement between the 
opinions of economic forecasters. Thus, EPU combines the different sources of 
uncertainty which are linked to the policy making and political conditions in an 
economy, without explicitly considering the country’s macroeconomic fundamentals; 
(iii) The Equity Market Uncertainty Index (EMU), which is based on an automated 
text-search process from Access World News’s NewsBank service news articles that 
contain terms related to "uncertainty", "economy", "stock price" and "equity market"; 
(iv) The Implied Volatility Index of S&P500 (VIX), which is often characterized as 
the “fear index” and it is the leading measure of market expectations of the implied 
volatility of S&P500 index options over the upcoming 30-day period; and (v) the 
Conditional Oil Price Volatility (OCV), which is a measure of commodity 
uncertainty. We approximate commodity-related uncertainty with the oil price 
volatility, given that oil is one of the most important traded commodities in the world 
and one of the most important production inputs. For this particular uncertainty 
indicator, we construct an additional oil price volatility series (vi), namely the 
Realized Oil Price Volatility (denoted as ORV) for robustness purposes
5
. The usage of 
these two volatility series is justified by the fact that realized volatility is a more 
precise and less noisy estimator, according to the literature (e.g. Andersen and 
Bollerslev, 1998), but it requires no-freely available data for its construction, which 
are not always available to researchers. On the other hand, the conditional volatility is 
a widely applied and accepted volatility estimator and requires daily data. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
many authors such as; Apergis and Miller (2009), Baumeister and Kilian (2014) and Alquist and Kilian 
(2010), among others. 
5
 We have also considered the volatility of the CRB Commodity index and the results remain 
qualitatively similar. 
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All data span from January 1994 to March 2015 and they are in monthly 
frequency, with only exception the data used for the OCV and ORV. The EPU and 
EMU have been extracted from Baker et al. (2016)
6
. In addition, Brent crude oil 
prices and the world oil production are obtained from the Energy Information 
Administration. We also obtain US CPI data, available from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics of the United States, which are used to convert Brent oil prices in real terms.  
The GEA is taken from Lutz Kilian’s personal site7, whereas the VIX come from 
FRED database. Finally, the JMU is retrieved from Ludvigson’s personal site8. 
For the construction of the OCV we collect daily Brent crude oil prices from 
Energy Information Administration, whereas tick-by-tick data of Brent crude oil 
prices, which are collected for the ORV, are obtained from TickData. For the latter 
the data span from August 2003 to March 2015, due to unavailability of longer period 
of the tick-by-tick data. The construction of the two oil price volatility series is 
presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We do not consider implied volatility given that this 
is not available for the Brent crude oil prices. 
We convert oil production data in its first-log differences, whereas GEA and 
all uncertainty indices are expressed in levels. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Oil price realized volatility 
Let us consider as        the observed Brent crude oil log-price at trading day 
t and j intra-day point. For j=1,..,τ equidistant intervals at each trading day, Andersen 
and Bollerslev (1998) provided evidence that the daily realized volatility is estimated 
to be the sum of squared intra-day returns: 
    
   
 √∑ (               )
 
 
   . 
(1) 
The realized volatility converges in probability to the integrated volatility,     
∫       , as the number of sub-intervals tends to infinity,    . However, the 
                                                          
6
In more details, the US policy uncertainty index appears at 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/us_monthly.html and the equity market uncertainty index appears at 
http://www.policyuncertainty.com/equity_uncert.html. 
7
 Lutz Kilian’s GEA index comes from http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/paperlinks.html and 
especially from the link: Updated version of the index of global real economic activity in industrial 
commodity markets, proposed in "Not all oil price shocks are alike ...", monthly percent deviations 
from trend, 1968.1-2015.9.  
8
 https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes. 
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microstructure frictions (i.e. discreteness of the data, transaction costs, taxes, 
regulatory costs, properties of the trading mechanism, bid-ask spreads, ect.) add more 
noise to the estimated volatility when the sampling frequency converges on zero. 
Thus, there is a trade-off between the bias that is inserted in the realized volatility 
measure and its accuracy.  
The daily variance,                
   can be decomposed into the intra-day 
variance,     
    
, and the intra-day autocovariance, ∑ ∑ (       
 
     
   
   
        ) (                   ): 
               
  
    
    
  ∑ ∑ (               ) (                   )
 
     
   
   . 
(2) 
The intra-day autocovariance represents the bias that is induced in the realized 
volatility measure, with  ((               ) (                   ))   , for 
   . Fang (1996) and Andersen et al. (2006) suggested the optimal sampling 
frequency being the highest frequency that minimises the autocovariance bias. In the 
case of Brent crude oil the (∑ ∑ (               ) (                   )
 
     
   
   ) is 
minimized at τ=23. Hence, the optimal sampling frequency is defined in 23 minutes.  
Furthermore, it is well established that when markets are closed, i.e. during 
night-time periods, holidays, and weekends, information still flows. Hansen and 
Lunde (2005), in order to account for changes in the asset prices during the hours that 
the market is closed, proposed to adjust the intra-day volatility with the close-to-open 
inter-day volatility, as: 
         
   
 √  (               )
 
   ∑(               )
 
 
   
  (3) 
where
9
 the weights    and    are such that minimise the difference between the 
realized volatility and the integrated volatility, i.e.     (         
    
    )
 . Of 
course, the     is unobservable. Thus, Hansen and Lunde (2005) proposed to solve 
    (         
    
), as they have stated that        (         
    
    )
  
                                                          
9
 The subscript      denotes the       measure according to Hansen and Lunde’s adjustment. 
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       (         
    
). Finally, the annualised monthly realized volatility series, 
    
   
, is constructed as: 
    
       √  ∑          
      
   . (4) 
  
3.2. Oil price conditional volatility 
 We estimate the conditional volatility of the oil daily log-returns using Ding's 
et al. (1993) APARCH model, in the spirit of Degiannakis et al. (2014). The 
APARCH model is estimated as: 
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(5) 
where 0
0
a , 0 , 01 b , 01 a  and 11 1   , 2 . 
The APARCH model is considered as one of the best models for estimating 
conditional volatility (for technical details, please see Xekalaki and Degiannakis, 
2010). 
We compute the annualised monthly conditional volatility,     
   
, as: 
    
       √  ∑    ⁄   
   
   , (6) 
where    ⁄   
  denotes the daily conditional variance for the t=1,...,22  trading days of 
month m. 
 
3.3. Structural VAR framework 
Prior to the examination of the time-varying responses of the uncertainty 
indicators to oil price shocks, we employ a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) 
model in order to explore the impact of oil price shocks (supply-side, aggregate 
demand and oil specific demand shocks) on the respective six uncertainty indices 
(UNCERT), based on the full sample. The supply-side shocks (SS) reflect unexpected 
changes in world oil production of crude oil (PROD), the aggregate demand shocks 
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(ADS) are identified from global real economic activity (GEA) and oil specific 
demand shocks (SDS) are estimated from changes in crude oil prices (ROIL). The 
generic name of uncertainty series is UNCERT. Our SVAR model has been adopted 
by Kilian and Park (2009). 
The standard representation of a general p
th
 order SVAR model is expressed in 
the following form: 
         ∑  
 
   
         (7) 
where,   represents the [    ] matrix that summarizes the contemporaneous 
relationship between the variables of the model,     is a [     ] vector of 
constants,   are [     ] autoregressive coefficient matrices and    is a [     ] 
vector of error terms “structural shocks” assumed to have zero covariance and be 
serially uncorrelated,        ,            and             . Finally,      is a 
[     ] vector of 4 endogenous variables and 
specifically    [                        ] , where         refers each 
time at one of the six uncertainty indicators that are considered in this study. 
The variance-covariance matrix of the structural shocks where all the elements 
off the main diagonal are zero is typically normalized that: 
            
[
 
 
 
 
  
    
   
   
    
  
     
 ]
 
 
 
 
 (8) 
The reduced form of our structural model is estimated by multiplying both sides with 
  
   as that: 
      ∑  
 
   
        (9) 
where,      
    ,      
     and       
     , i.e.          . The reduced- 
form errors    are linear combinations of the structural errors   , with a covariance 
matrix of the form can be expressed as             
     
   .  
In order to obtain the structural shocks we need to impose suitable short-run 
restrictions on    , as follows: 
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  (10) 
In which     
   captures the supply side shocks (SS),     
    reflects the aggregate oil 
demand shocks (ADS),     
    denotes the oil specific demand shocks (SDS) and     
    
measures the uncertainty shocks (UNS). We should emphasize here that we run six 
separate SVAR models, one for each uncertainty indicator
10
. Once again, we should 
highlight that the short-term restrictions which are necessary in the context of 
structural vector autoregressive models are based on Kilian and Park (2009).  
In particular, according to Kilian and Park (2009), oil production does not 
respond contemporaneously to shocks in oil demand and oil prices, due to the high 
adjustment costs. By contrast, changes in the world oil production have an immediate 
effect on oil demand and they are instantly captured in oil price fluctuations, hence 
both aggregate demand and oil prices are allowed to receive contemporaneous effects 
from changes in the world oil production. Furthermore, given the time lag that is 
required for the global economy to respond to changes in oil prices, we do not allow 
for a contemporaneous effects on the global economic activity to changes in oil 
prices. However, shocks in aggregate economic activity are anticipated to trigger 
immediate (and thus contemporaneous) effects on oil prices. Finally, we posit that 
economic/financial uncertainty responds contemporaneously to all aforementioned oil 
price shocks, whereas the reverse does not hold true.  
 
3.4. Time-Varying Parameter Vector AutoRegression 
In the time-varying parameter VAR model (TVP-VAR): 
        ∑     
 
          , (11) 
the vector     of Eq. (9) is a [4 × 1]  vector of time-varying coefficients, whereas 
     [
                 
   
                 
] are matrices of time-varying coefficients 
                                                          
10
 The length of the lags for the SVAR models is determined by Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
The AIC criterion for each of the six SVAR models is the following; model with JMU with three lags, 
models with EPU, EMU, VIX and OCV with two lags and model with ORV with five lags. All SVAR 
models satisfy the stability condition. We do not use all six indicators in one SVAR model, given that 
we are primarily concerned with the effects of oil price shocks and each of the uncertainty indicators, 
rather than the interactions among the sources of uncertainty. 
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and           . The time-varying covariance matrix is recursively identified by the 
decomposition: 
     
          
    , (12) 
where    is a lower-triangular matrix with the diagonal elements equal to one, and 
       (           ) . All the elements of the time-varying matrices are stacked in 
row vectors such as: 
   (           ) , (13) 
   (                                        ) , (14) 
   (   (    
 )      (    
 ))  . (15) 
The time-varying parameters follow the random walk process: 
              ,      (         ), (16) 
              ,      (         ), (17) 
              ,      (         ), (18) 
where [
      
      
      
]   (  [
      
      
      
]). The reduced form of the structural 
model can be regarded as a nested model of the TVP-VAR
11
 for           
      . Denoting as (    )  the i
th
 diagonal element of matrix      , the prior 
distributions employed are: (    ) 
  
          , (    ) 
  
            and 
(    ) 
  
          , where        is the Gamma distribution. The lag length of the 
TVP-VAR models is selected according to the highest marginal likelihood as 
suggested by Nakajima et al. (2011)
12
. The prior distribution for the initial values of 
the row vectors   ,    and    is the normal with the mean and variance set equal to 
the OLS estimates using the dataset of the first 5 years. The Gibbs sampler of the 
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method
13
 is implemented to generate samples 
from the posterior distributions of        and   . The MCMC algorithm is presented 
in detail in Nakajima (2011). The MCMC algorithm has been implemented with 
25000 iterations (after a 2500 burn-in). A higher number of iterations was also 
                                                          
11
 See also Gali and Gambetti (2015). 
12
 Four lags for the models with EMU, EPU and JMU, five lags for the models with ORV and OCV 
and seven lags for the model with VIX. 
13
 Technical information for the Bayesian estimation of the models is available in Nakajima (2011), 
Koop and Korobilis (2010) and Primiceri (2005). 
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employed but it required substantially more time for the estimation of the parameters 
with no changes in the parameters’ estimations. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Figures 1 to 2 plot the evolution of all the data series over time. The figures 
depict the peaks and troughs of world oil production, global real economic activity, 
oil log-returns and uncertainty measures. The selected time period of data includes the 
early-2000 recession in the US, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 and the 
ongoing European debt crisis. As evident by Figures 1 and 2 most series exhibit either 
unprecedented peaks or troughs during the GFC. Interestingly, the EMU reached its 
unprecedented levels during the early-2000 recession and EPU in 2011 and 2013, 
which are the periods characterised by the debt ceiling dispute and the fears for 
government shutdown, respectively. Another notable observation is that GEA 
fluctuates at really low levels in the latter part of our sample period, suggesting that 
the global economy does not show signs of recovery. It is interesting that the GEA 
value in this latter period is even lower than its value during the GFC.  
 [FIGURE 1 HERE] 
[FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the chosen variables. It is evident 
that the most volatile uncertainty index is the EMU, followed by the VIX index, in 
terms of the coefficient of variation. Interestingly enough, the least volatile 
uncertainty series is the JMU. Furthermore, as depicted by the skewness, kurtosis and 
Jarque-Bera test, none of the series under consideration are normally distributed, 
where most series exhibit a leptokurtic distribution. In addition, all uncertainty 
indicators are positively skewed, indicating that they exhibit instances of extreme 
uncertainty conditions. Finally, according to the ADF test all variables are stationary.  
 [TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
4.2 Structural Impulse Responses to Oil Price Shocks: SVAR 
First, we examine the dynamic adjustment of each uncertainty measure to 
unexpected structural oil price shocks as referred to Kilian and Park (2009) for the full 
sample period and then we will proceed with the results of the TVP-VAR.  
13 
 
Figure 3 reports the accumulated impulse responses of each uncertainty series 
to one standard deviation structural shocks from the oil supply side, the aggregate 
demand of crude oil and the oil-specific demand for a time period of 24–months.  
 [FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Starting the analysis from an unexpected positive oil supply shock (Shock 1) 
and specifically looking at the first column of Figure 3, we observe that none of the 
uncertainty indicators exhibits any significant response to oil supply shock. A 
plausible explanation of the non-effect of the oil supply shocks is that financial and 
commodities markets, as well as, economies worldwide are familiar with OPEC 
practices and hence, they are not “surprised” even when unanticipated oil supply 
disruptions or increases take place. Such finding is also in line with Kilian (2009). 
More specifically, OPEC usually decides not to reduce production levels to maintain 
its market share, as competition from other sides intensifies with undeniable example 
the shale oil production from the United States. The aforementioned findings find 
support from the existing literature, such as, Kilian and Park (2009), Kilian (2009), 
Hamilton (2009), Bloom (2009), Alquist and Kilian (2010), Filis et al. (2011), Stock 
and Watson (2012), Kang and Ratti (2013), Degiannakis et al. (2014) and Aloui et al. 
(2016) who maintain that disturbances from the supply-side shall result in small and 
transient changes in oil prices and therefore do not significantly affect economic and 
financial indicators. On the other hand, our findings do not confirm those by Kang et 
al. (2017) who maintain that supply-side shocks originating from oil supply 
disruptions by the US lead to an increase in EPU. 
Focusing on the second column of Figure 3, we show the uncertainty 
responses to positive aggregate demand shocks (Shock 2). Interestingly enough the 
responses are not homogeneous, which suggests that the multiple faces of uncertainty 
within the economy could be impacted differently by oil price shocks. Hence, 
monitoring the different responses from each uncertainty indicators is essential in 
disentangling how oil price shocks propagate their effects in the different uncertainty 
sources of economic activity. More specifically, four out of the six uncertainty series 
are affected, namely the JMU, VIX, OCV and ORV; however, the latter two exhibit a 
significant response only in the very short-run (the response become insignificant 
after 3 months). Even more we find that positive aggregate demand shocks lead to 
negative responses from the aforementioned uncertainty indicators, except for JMU. 
This is rather expected as aggregate demand shocks are related to increased global 
14 
 
economic activity, which can be regarded as positive news for the business and the 
financial sectors leading to lower uncertainty. The finding for VIX echoes this by 
Degiannakis et al. (2014) who maintain that European stock market volatility 
responds negatively to positive aggregate demand shocks. It is interesting that 
economic policy uncertainty (EPU) does not respond to aggregate demand shocks, 
which are not in line with the findings reported by Kang and Ratti (2013), 
Antonakakis et al. (2014) and Kang et al. (2017) who find evidence that aggregate 
demand shocks exercise a significantly negative effect on EPU. Such difference could 
lie in the fact that this study is using a different time period, which could suggest that 
these relationships vary depending on the time period.  
Finally, the effects of an unanticipated positive oil specific demand shock 
(Shock 3) are presented in the third column of Figure 3. Once again heterogeneity in 
responses of the uncertainty indices is evident. In particular, we observe a positive 
response from JMU and negative responses from VIX, OCV and ORV. By contrast, 
no responses are observed for EPU and EMU. The results for the OCV and ORV are 
somewhat expected, especially when these are combined with the ORV responses to 
aggregate demand shocks. We maintain that oil price increases due to demand side 
shocks (either aggregate demand or oil specific demand shocks) tend to reduce oil 
price volatility due to the leverage effects
14
. The results for the JMU is also expected, 
given that increased uncertainty about the future availability of oil, which drives oil 
prices in higher levels, is negative news for the macroeconomic uncertainty. On the 
other hand though, the findings for VIX are rather counter-intuitive. Based on claim 
put forward for the JMU response to oil specific demand shocks, a positive response 
from the VIX index would be also anticipated. Overall, we do not offer support to the 
findings by Kang and Ratti (2013), Antonakakis et al. (2014) and Kang et al. (2017) 
who show that actually EPU responses positively to positive oil specific demand 
shocks. Nevertheless, the findings by Kang et al. (2017) suggest a marginal effect of 
oil specific shocks to EPU.   
A plausible explanation of our findings could be that the behaviour of the 
uncertainty indices to oil price shocks is changing over time and thus we cannot 
observe similar findings with the previous literature (e.g. Kang and Ratti, 2013; 
                                                          
14
 For instance, if we estimate an asymmetric GARCH model in the daily frequency of the oil price 
returns, the asymmetric parameter of the conditional volatility is positive and significant at any 
conventional significance level. 
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Degiannakis et al., 2014; Kang et al., 2017). In is interesting that all previous studies 
have used different time periods, yet similar approaches. This strengthens our 
argument that the aforementioned effects depend on the period under examination and 
thus they are time-varying. Thus, we need to proceed with the estimation of a TVP-
VAR, which will allow us to assess if these responses are indeed time-varying.  
 Apart from the impulse responses, it is interesting to examine the variance 
decompositions of the uncertainty indices (see Table 2). 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 Table 2 reveals that for the majority of uncertainty indices the supply-side 
shocks do not seem to explain the forecast error variance decomposition. These 
findings corroborate previous findings which agree on the no-existent or marginal 
effects of the supply-side oil price shocks to economic and financial indicators (see, 
for instance, Filis et al., 2011; Stock and Watson, 2012; Kang and Ratti, 2013; 
Degiannakis et al., 2014; Aloui et al., 2016). By contrast, though, supply-side shocks 
seem to explain a high proportion of the JMU variance. Turning our attention to the 
two demand-side shocks, it is interesting to observe that they contribute to the 
variance of the two commodity uncertainty indicators and JMU at a relatively high 
degree (ranging between 32% and 61% on aggregate, approximately). However, such 
claims do not hold for the financial and policy-related uncertainty, which seem to be 
primarily impact by their own variance. Overall, the findings from Table 2 
corroborate those of the impulse responses. 
 
4.3. Structural Impulse Responses to Oil Price Shocks: TVP-VAR 
Having examined the results for the full sample period, we proceed with the 
TVP-VAR model which allows us to investigate the impulse responses at different 
time periods, without estimating a model for each separate time period
15
. 
The time-varying responses to shocks for 0, 1, 3, 6, 12 and 18 months horizons 
are presented in Figures 4 and 5. We should emphasize here that for the TVP-VAR 
models the interpretation of the impulse responses is not clear as the one-standard-
                                                          
15
 For brevity we do not include here the parameters estimates, the sample autocorrelation, the 
Geweke’s CD statistics and the inefficiencies. The same holds for the stochastic volatility estimates 
over time. The results show that MCMC algorithm has produced the posteriors efficiently and that 
stochastic volatility is indeed time-varying. These are available upon request. In addition, given that 
figures contain the impulse responses from three different horizons, confidence intervals are not 
included for easier exposition. We should highlight though that we only interpret the significant 
impulse responses. 
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deviation shock corresponds to shocks of different size as we move across time. Thus, 
we follow Nakajima (2011) and compute the impulse responses by fixing an initial 
shock size equal to the average of stochastic volatility over the sample period and 
employing the simultaneous relations at each point in time. The recursive innovation 
of the variable is constructed based on the estimated time-varying coefficients from 
the current date to future periods 
 [FIGURES 4 and 5 HERE] 
It is evident that impulse responses vary at different time periods, which 
provides support to the estimation of a TVP-VAR model. Furthermore, apart from the 
time-varying character of the impulse responses, we observe that these responses are 
quite heterogeneous depending on the shock and the uncertainty indicator. 
Starting from the supply-side shocks, the responses are mainly negative for all 
uncertainty indices, suggesting that positive supply-side shocks lead to a reduction in 
economic and financial uncertainty. These results hold for the short-run impulse 
responses (1-6 months) as in the longer-run (i.e. 12 and 18 months) the responses are 
insignificant. It is also interesting to note that in most cases the responses appear with 
one month lag, given that the immediate impulse responses are not significant. These 
findings are rather interesting, as they are in contrast to the majority of the studies, 
which report insignificant effects of supply-side shocks in the economy (see, for 
instance, Filis et al., 2011; Degiannakis et al., 2014; Aloui et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
we can observe that magnitude of the responses is not constant and in cases such as 
VIX and JMU a declining pattern is evident, suggesting that in the more recent years, 
these two uncertainty indicators do not really react to supply-side shocks (at least in 
the medium and long-run, from 3 up to 18 months ahead). By contrast, EMU and EPU 
seem to be more responsive to these shocks since 2003.  
We further our analysis with the examination of the aggregate demand shocks. 
In Section 4.2 we concluded that uncertainty indicators respond favourably to these 
shocks (i.e. positive aggregate demand shocks lead to lower uncertainty). 
Nevertheless, the TVP-VAR results suggest that even though a favourable response 
prevails (i.e. negative impulse responses), there are periods where positive aggregate 
demand shocks lead to increased uncertainty, especially in the medium run (between 
3 and 6 months ahead). This is particularly evident in the period 2010-2014. This is a 
very interesting finding, which further justifies the use of a time-varying environment 
in order to unravel the relationship between uncertainty and oil shocks. For instance, a 
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plausible explanation could be found in the fact that, in the post-GFC period, we 
observe that even though GEA is exhibiting a declining trend, the financial 
uncertainty is also reaching its lowest levels (at least in our sample period), as shown 
in Figure 1. The latter can be explained by the fact that in the post-GFC period we 
observe the financial uncertainty to be resolved and being reverted back to the pre-
crisis levels, whereas, by contrast, the global economic activity is still in the lower 
part of the business cycle (see also Cesa-Bianchi  et al., 2014).  
We finalise the analysis with the time-varying responses to oil specific 
demand shocks. We show that there are periods where these shocks increase the 
economic and financial uncertainty, as expected, although the significant responses in 
some cases appear only in the short- to medium-run (i.e. up to 6 months ahead). Even 
more, it is evident from the impulse responses that the shocks are absorbed in the 
long-run as the 12 and 18 months-ahead impulse responses are insignificant. 
Nevertheless, we also show that there are periods where the opposite behaviour is 
observed, i.e. where a positive oil specific demand shock (i.e. an uncertainty-
generating source) triggers negative responses from the uncertainty indicators (i.e. 
reduces uncertainty)
16
, which is rather unexpected. More specifically, we notice that 
this unexpected finding is mainly associated with the latter part of our sample period. 
A closer investigation, though, suggests that such finding is not unexpected at all. In 
particular, in the post-GFC period a series of conflicts that raise geopolitical unrest 
(the main source of the oil specific demand shocks) have taken place (e.g. the Libyan 
political turmoil, the political turbulence in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain and the war in 
Syria), however, oil prices exhibited a declining pattern, which gave rise to increased 
speculation in the oil market and accumulation of oil reserves. Hence, due to the 
accumulation of these oil reserves, the oil specific shocks in the latter part of our 
study period do not lead to higher economic and financial uncertainty. Thus, we can 
conclude that the previous findings which suggest that oil specific shocks are 
expected to trigger higher uncertainty do not hold throughout the study period but 
rather responses are indeed time-varying. 
 
                                                          
16
 We note that the literature has documented that positive oil price shocks trigger negative responses 
from financial markets (i.e. negative returns). We, thus, claim that our finding is rather unexpected, 
given that negative returns should be associated with increased uncertainty rather than the opposite.  
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5. Conclusion 
This study adds to the extremely scarce literature on the effects of oil price 
shocks on economic and financial uncertainty. Even more, we assess whether these 
effects are time-varying. In particular, we focus on the US economic and financial 
uncertainty using monthly data over the period from January 1994 to March 2015. 
Economic and financial uncertainty is approximated by six indicators, namely, JMU, 
EPU, EMU, VIX, OCV and ORV. The study uses a Structural VAR model, similar to 
Kilian and Park (2009), as well as, a TVP-VAR. 
The impulse responses to structural oil price shocks from the SVAR model 
reveal that oil supply shocks do not exercise any significant impact on uncertainty 
indicators. Such findings lend support to the existing literature (see, inter alia, 
Degiannakis et al., 2014; Antonakakis et al., 2014; Aloui et al., 2016) who argue that 
oil supply-side shocks do not exert a significant impact in the economy or the 
financial markets. Furthermore, we report that aggregate demand shocks trigger lower 
uncertainty, which is in line with Degiannakis et al. (2014). Finally, based on the 
SVAR results we cannot claim that oil specific demand shocks are uncertainty 
enhancing shocks.  
The TVP-VAR results suggest that the responses of the uncertainty indices to 
the three oil price shocks are indeed time-varying and, thus, static approaches could 
result in counter-intuitive results. The time-varying impulse responses show that 
uncertainty indices exhibit heterogeneous responses to all three shocks, as well as, 
during different time periods. Nevertheless, we notice that for the largest part of our 
sample period, supply-side and aggregate demand oil price shocks tend to decrease 
the level of economic and financial uncertainty in the US.  
We are aware that economic and financial uncertainty indicators are 
considered as key elements for policy making and investment decisions, and thus, our 
findings are important for policy makers, as well as, investors. Overall, we show that 
the effects of oil price shocks to the different faces of economic uncertainty are not 
only time-specific but also depend on the source of the uncertainty that one examines. 
Hence, given that oil price shocks could destabilize the policy outcome, policy makers 
should take into account the sources of oil price shocks at the time of the decision and 
the uncertainty sources that they are targeting, when making informed decisions on 
macroeconomic policies that resolve economic uncertainty. Furthermore, our results 
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should be considered when investors make decisions regarding the investment in 
volatility indices or risk management strategies.   
Further research could investigate as to whether oil shocks trigger time-
varying responses on other economic and financial indicators. Even more, future 
studies could expand the scope of this analysis to the global uncertainty utilizing 
global uncertainty indices such as the global EPU and the geopolitical risk index. 
Furthermore, separating the US and non-US supply-side oil price shocks could be an 
interesting avenue for future research. Finally, given the increased importance of 
uncertainty indicators in economic and financial decision making, it is important to 
examine the ability of oil price shocks to improve the forecasting accuracy of these 
indicators. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of the series. The period spans from January 1994 to March 2015. 
Series Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Max. Min. Skew. Kurt. Jarque-Bera ADF  
PROD 254 0.0013 0.0078 0.0259 -0.0249 -0.1724 3.913 10.0917*** -13.764**  
GEA 254 0.0309 0.2703 0.6248 -0.6386 0.2667 2.310 8.0743** -2.928**  
ROIL 254 0.0054 0.0885 0.2007 -0.3109 -0.7609 4.242 40.8410*** -13.034***  
JMU 254 0.6499 0.0859 1.0223 0.5537 2.0165 8.2596 466.7422*** -2.761*  
EPU 254 1.0450 0.3612 2.4512 0.5720 1.1199 3.586 56.9578*** -4.360***  
EMU 254 0.7243 0.6207 4.9603 0.1309 2.7976 1.370 1547.7201*** -6.727***  
VIX 254 0.2040 0.0807 0.6264 0.1082 1.8723 8.618 484.3670*** -3.708***  
OCV 254 0.3381 0.1147 0.8438 0.1439 1.3976 6.419 207.2584*** -4.123***  
ORV 140 0.2848 0.1282 0.9375 0.0998 2.3276 10.786 480.0866*** -2.582*  
*, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Table 2. Forecast error variance decomposition. The period spans from 
January 1994 to March 2015. 
Series PROD GEA ROIL Uncertainty index 
JMU 17.6542 22.8411 13.6698 45.8349 
EPU 0.9048 0.4629 0.8614 97.7709 
EMU 1.9738 3.2303 0.5868 94.2090 
VIX 5.5943 5.6615 5.9597 82.7845 
OCV 1.2774 2.9209 30.5170 65.2847 
ORV 0.4029 12.7525 48.0558 38.7889 
Note: We only show the 24 months ahead forecast error variance decompositions. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Changes in World Oil Production (PROD), Global Real Economic Activity 
(GEA) and Changes in Crude Oil Prices (ROIL) from January 1994 to March 2015. 
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Figure 2. The US uncertainty measures and oil price volatility from January 1994 to 
March 2015.  
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Note: JMU = Jurado’s et al. (2015) Macroeconomic Uncertainty, EPU = Economic Policy Uncertainty, 
EMU = Equity Market Uncertainty Index, VIX = Implied Volatility Index of S&P500, OCV = Oil 
Conditional Volatility, ORV = Oil Realized Volatility. 
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Figure 3. Accumulated impulse responses of the uncertainty indices to oil price shocks 
(Shock 1: SS, Shock 2: ADS, Shock 3: SDS), based on the SVAR model. 
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Note: Shocks successively refer to: Shock 1 to Oil Supply Shocks (SS), Shock 2 to Aggregate Oil 
Demand Shocks (ADS) and Shock 3 to Oil-Specific Demand Shocks (SDS). The series of the 
uncertainty measures (UNCERT), vertically, are the following: Jurado’s et al. (2015) Macroeconomic 
Uncertainty (JMU), Economic Policy Uncertainty Index (EPU), Equity Market Uncertainty Index 
(EMU), Implied Volatility Index of S&P500 (VIX), Oil Conditional Volatility (OCV) and Oil Realized 
Volatility (ORV). 
Dotted lines depict the 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 4. Impulse responses of the uncertainty indices to oil price shocks for 0, 1 and 3 
months ahead, based on the TVP-VAR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The thin, dotted and bold lines correspond to the responses of the uncertainty indices to oil price 
shocks for 0, 1 and 3 months ahead, respectively.  
Impulse responses for the ORV start in 2003, whereas for the remaining uncertainty indicators the starting 
data of the impulse responses is 1994. 
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Figure 5. Impulse responses of the uncertainty indices to oil price shocks for 6, 12 and 
18 months ahead, based on the TVP-VAR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The thin, dotted and bold lines correspond to the responses of the uncertainty indices to oil price 
shocks for 6, 12 and 18 months ahead, respectively. 
Impulse responses for the ORV start in 2003, whereas for the remaining uncertainty indicators the starting 
data of the impulse responses is 1994. 
 
